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Constitutional Law-COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE-A CLARIFI- 
CATION OF THE PROTECTION AFFORDED ADVERTISING UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT-Bigelow U. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
Appellant Bigelow, managing editor of a Charlottesville, 
Virginia weekly newspaper, published an advertisement for a 
New York abortion referral and placement center.' As a result of 
that act, he was prosecuted and convicted for violating a Virginia 
statute which made it a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the 
procuring of an abortion by the sale or circulation of any publica- 
t i ~ n . ~  Bigelow appealed his con~ic t ion ,~  challenging the statute on 
1. The advertisement was published in the Virginia Weekly, Feb. 8, 1971, a t  2, under 
the direct responsibility of the appellant: 
UNWANTED PREGNANCY 
LET US HELP YOU 
Abortions are now legal in New York. 
There are no residency requirements. 
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN 
ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND 
CLINICS AT LOW COST 
Contact 
WOMEN'S PAVILION 
515 Madison Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10022 
or call any time 
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650 
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make all 
arrangements for you and help you with 
information and counseling. 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 812 (1975). 
2. Ch. 385, 4 18.1-63, [I9601 Va. Acts of Assembly 428: 
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circula- 
tion of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procur- 
ing of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
This statute was amended shortly after the appellant's conviction and again after the 
Supreme Court's decision in the instant case. The most current version reads: 
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circula- 
tion of any publication, or through the use of a referral agency for profit, or in 
any other manner, encourage or promote the performing of an abortion or the 
inducing of a miscarriage in this state which is prohibited under this article, he 
shall be guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (1975), amending VA. CODE ANN. $ 18.1-63 (1972), amending 
ch. 385, 4 18.1-63, [I9601 Va. Acts of Assembly 428 (emphasis added). 
The statute as amended would not have reached the appellant's actions since the 
advertisement was for a New York referral agency which provided the abortion service in 
New York and therefore did not encourage abortions within the State of Virginia. 
3. The appellant was first tried and convicted in the County Court of Albemarle 
County. He then appealed to the circuit court of that county where he received a trial de 
novo before a judge on evidence consisting of stipulated facts. This evidence included an 
excerpt containing the advertisement in question and the June 1971 issue of Redbook 
magazine which was distributed in Virginia and contained abortion information. Appel- 
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first amendment grounds as an abridgement of freedom of press 
and speech, and as being overbroad. The Supreme Court of Vir- 
ginia affirmed the conviction, holding that the first amendment 
does not prohibit government regulation of commercial advertis- 
ing.' On review, the United States Supreme Court vacated the 
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of 
recent intervening cases dealing with state anti-abortion laws.5 
Upon reconsideration, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed its 
prior decision, finding nothing "which in any way affects our 
earlier view? Bigelow again appealed. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the Virginia 
statute infringed upon constitutionally protected speech under 
the first amendment. 
A. The  Commercial Speech Doctrine in  the Supreme Court 
Not all speech is protected by the first amendment.' One 
such unprotected area of speech, "purely commercial advertis- 
lant was sentenced to pay a fine of 500 dollars with 350 dollars thereof suspended condi- 
tioned upon no further violation of the statute. Brief for Appellant a t  5, Bigelow v. Vir- 
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
4. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 194, 191 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1972). The 
appellant was denied standing to challenge the statute as overbroad by the Virginia 
Supreme Court. Id. a t  198, 191 S.E.2d a t  178. 
The United States Supreme Court in the instant case recognized the standing of the 
appellant to challenge the Virginia statute as being overbroad under the principles set 
forth in Dombrowski u. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The Court declined to base its 
decision on the issue of overbreath, however, because as a practical matter it was mooted 
by the subsequent statutory amendment and because the "commercial speech" issue was 
of "greater moment." 421 U.S. a t  818. 
5. Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)). 
6. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341,200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). Examination of the 
cases shows that the Virginia Supreme Court was correct. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), invalidated all state statutes which prohib- 
ited abortions prior to viability. Neither case mentioned anything about advertising. The 
only possible application these two cases might have is to indicate the importance of 
abortion as a matter of "public interest" and to show the possible illegality of the law 
under which Bigelow was convicted. The Supreme Court ultimately noted its agreement 
with the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion that this was not an abortion case. 421 U.S. 
a t  815 n.5. 
7. "Fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), "ob- 
scenity," Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973), Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
481-85 (1957), "libel," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974), and "words 
of incitement," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969), have traditionally not been 
protected by the first amendment because such speech is considered "patently offensive." 
Commercial speech, while often not protected by the first amendment, is not "patently 
offensive" and should not, therefore, be grouped with the above-listed types of speech. 
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ing," was identified in Valentine v. Chre~tensen,~ a 1942 case in 
which Chrestensen sought to circumvent a New York City ordi- 
nance proscribing the distribution of commercial handbills by 
attaching to the reverse side of a handbill, which advertised tours 
of a submarine, a protest against the city for not allowing him to 
exhibit his submarine at a municipal pier. When the police inter- 
fered with the distribution of his handbill, Chrestensen sought an 
injunction, arguing that the ordinance unconstitutionally de- 
prived him of freedom of speech. The Court rejected his claim, 
stating: 
This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are pro- 
per places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating 
information and disseminating opinion and that, though the 
states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privi- 
lege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or pro- 
scribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are 
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on 
government as respects purely commercial ad~ertising.~ 
The last sentence of the foregoing quotation has commonly been 
cited in Supreme Court and lower court opinions as the origin of 
the "commercial speech doctrine."1° The Chrestensen Court, 
however, failed to articulate a rationale for its refusal to grant 
first amendment protection to purely commercial speech.ll Fur- 
ther, the Court failed to define the scope of the doctrine." Subse- 
quent judicial attempts to reconcile the commercial speech doc- 
trine with the "fundamental rights"13 and the "preferred posi- 
8. 316 US.  52 (1942). 
9. Id. at 54 (emphasis added). 
10. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 
US.  376, 384 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U S .  934 (1972); Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 193, 191 S.E.2d 173, 175 
(1972). 
11. Commentators often assume that the genesis of this idea comes from the power 
or the right of the government to regulate commercial activity. See Developments in the 
Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
Developments in the Law]. 
12. Although Chrestensen spoke of "purely commercial advertising," the commercial 
speech doctrine includes all commercial speech. This creates considerable confusion on 
first impression because the terms "purely commercial advertising," "purely commercial 
speech," "commercial advertising," "commercial speech," and "advertising" are often 
used interchangeably. Most cases using the commercial speech doctrine have involved 
commercial advertising, but other areas of commercial speech have also been denied first 
amendment protection by the doctrine. These include the credit rating cases, see, e.g., 
Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 30 (5th Cir. 1973); Millstone v. O'Hanlon 
Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 274 (E.D. Mo. 1974); and symbolic speech cases, see, e.g., 
Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504, 508-09 (D. Neb. 1971). 
13. See Whitney v. California, 274 U S .  357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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tion"14 of speech and press in a wide variety of cases factually 
distinct from Chrestensen likewise did not provide adequate 
guidelines for those attempting to understand the parameters of 
the doctrine.15 
The Supreme Court has generally grounded its decisions in 
the area on one of two tests. 
1. The primary purpose test 
In Chrestensen, the Court implicitly relied upon a test which 
focused on the "primary purpose" of the advertiser in determin- 
ing whether the advertisement was entitled to first amendment 
protection. This test focused not on the speech in the advertise- 
ment itself but on the motive of the person producing the adver- 
tisement. The Court determined that Chrestensen's primary pur- 
pose in circulating his handbill was commercial and that, al- 
though he had added to the handbill a political protest which 
ordinarily would have received first amendment protection, the 
protest was attached solely to circumvent the city ordinance. 
Therefore, the political protest was viewed as incidental to and a 
part of the commercial speech and not protected by the first 
amendment. l6 
In Murdock v. Penn~ylvania,'~ the Court again faced a ques- 
tion of mixed protected and unprotected speech. Murdock, a Je- 
hovah's Witness who sold religious pamphlets while soliciting 
converts, challenged a city ordinance which required any person 
who solicited within the city to purchase a license. He argued that 
the requirement was a violation of his first amendment rights of 
Brandeis' concurring opinion is considered a classic defense of the fundamental import- 
ance of free speech. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL L W 1044 
(9th ed. 1975). 
14. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,90-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The 
concurring opinion by Frankfurter gives a summary of the preferred position arguments 
found in Supreme Court opinions. 
15. For a discussion of the problems experienced by lower courts in using these 
guidelines, see text accompanying notes 42-46 infra. The Supreme Court has not used the 
commercial speech doctrine extensively. With the exception of the religious pamphleteer- 
ing cases of the 1940's, see note 17 infra, the "commercial speech doctrine" surfaced only 
occasionally, either as dicta in decisions on other grounds or as the subject of criticism in 
separate opinions. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) 
(decided on libel grounds); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (decided on 
right of privacy grounds); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (decided on other first 
amendment grounds); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,513-15 (1959) (Douglas, 
J., concurring). 
16. 316 U.S. a t  55. 
17. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). For other Jehovah's Witnesses cases with similar fact situa- 
tions and holdings, see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 
318 U.S. 413 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942). 
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freedom of speech and religion.18 Employing a primary purpose 
test to reach its decision, the Court held that an element of com- 
mercial activity does not preclude first amendment protection if 
the primary motivation of the activity is not commercial.lg The 
Court stated: 
[Tlhe mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itiner- 
ant preachers rather than "donated" does not transform evan- 
gelism into a commercial enterprise. . . . The right to use the 
press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the 
protection afforded commercial handbilk20 
In Breard u. City of A l e ~ a n d r i a , ~ ~  the Court again applied the 
primary purpose test. Breard involved an ordinance which pro- 
hibited salesmen from soliciting door-to-door without prior au- 
thorization by the landowner or resident of the dwelling. A door- 
to-door salesman of national magazines, convicted for a violation 
of the ordinance, asserted that the ordinance abridged his first 
amendment right of freedom of speech.22 The Court upheld the 
ordinance, stating that the petitioner's selling brought "into the 
transaction a commercial feature,"23 or motive, which when 
weighed against the homeowner's right to privacy, was entitled 
to little weight.24 
Commentators have called the primary purpose test 
and of "little sense, either theoretically or practi- 
 ally."^^ Many argue that financial motive is irrelevant if it is 
acknowledged that an important aspect of the first amendment 
is the listener's interest in acquiring kn~wledge.~' Furthermore, 
they assert that the logical extension of the primary purpose test 
would seriously reduce the scope of first amendment protection 
"accorded virtually all periodicals, books, and newspapers, since 
all these methods of communication are . . . primarily concerned 
with maximizing profits."28 The commentators also point to the 
-- - --  
18. 319 U.S. a t  107. 
- 
19. Id. a t  111-12. 
20. Id. a t  111. 
21. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
22. Id. a t  625. 
23. Id. a t  642. 
24. See id. at  644-45. Breard is unique in the series of cases using the primary purpose 
test in that the Court used a balancing approach. 
25. Developments in the Law, supra note 11, a t  1028. 
26. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the 
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH.  L. REV. 429, 452 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
Redish]. 
27. See, e.g., id. 
28. Id. Obviously, the Court has never extended the primary purpose test this far. 
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inadequacy of the primary purpose test when protected speech is 
mixed with unprotected speech. The test results in either com- 
plete protection or complete lack of protection for the communi- 
cation. This "either-or" approach fails to accommodate the fact 
that communications fall along a continuum ranging from speech 
meriting no first amendment protection to speech meriting a full 
measure of such p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  
2. The content test 
In New York Times Co. v. S u l l i ~ a n , ~ ~  the Times and four 
clergymen were sued by Sullivan who claimed that the Times' 
publication of a full page, paid political advertisement was libel- 
OUS.~* Relying on the commercial speech doctrine of Chrestensen, 
plaintiff sought to avoid any question of first amendment protec- 
tion of the libelous speech.32 The Court, apparently relying on an 
approach which focused on the substantive content of the adver- 
tisement rather than the primary purpose or motive of the adver- 
t i ~ e r , ~ ~  found the advertisement to be political and therefore pro- 
tected by the first amendment.34 The Court distinguished 
Chrestensen noting that: 
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U S .  254, 266 (1964); Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 
(1952) (movies); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (newspapers). 
29. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, a t  1027-28. The idea of a continuum 
of first amendment protection ranging from full protection to little or no protection is the 
result of the balancing technique often employed by the Court in first amendment cases. 
See note 60 infra. Any given first amendment interest in a particular controversy will, 
however, ultimately be either "protected" or not protected. That is, the first amendment 
interest will either prevail over competing interests or not prevail. Nevertheless, the term 
"first amendment protection," as used in this case note, is a shorthand statement for 
"value of the first ;mendment interest in free speech." In other words, when the Court is 
said to accord a certain quantum of first amendment protection to a particular expression, 
it means that the Court has ascribed a certain value or weight to the first amendment 
interest involved. Most judges and commentators use the term "first amendment protec- 
tion" in this way. See, e.g., 421 U.S. a t  821; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298, 314 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on 
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384, 386 (1973); Redish, supra note 26, a t  431, 447, 472; 
Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitu- 
tional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775, 797 (1975). 
30. 376 US.  254 (1964). 
31. Id. a t  256. 
32. Id. a t  265-66. 
33. The Supreme Court has never explicitly rejected the primary purpose test, but 
because of its limited utility it has fallen into disuse. See text accompanying notes 25-34 
supra. For a recent lower court case using this test, see Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504, 
509 (D. Neb. 1971) (motive determines what is commercial speech); cf. United States v. 
Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972) (intent of 
speaker may be dispositive in determining the level of first amendment protection). 
34. 376 U.S. a t  266. 
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The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in 
the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It commu- 
nicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, pro- 
tested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf 
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the 
highest public interest and concern. That the Times was paid 
for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this 
connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.35 
A content analysis was again used in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human  relation^.^^ The newspaper's 
use of sex-designated column headings in its classified advertis- 
ing section was held to be a violation of a local ordinance that 
prohibited sex dis~rimination.~' The Court found that the content 
of the advertisements was purely commercial and therefore with- 
out first amendment protection. 
In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record 
resemble the Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan advertise- 
ment. None [of the advertisements] expresses a position on 
whether, as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought to 
be filled by members of one or the other sex, nor does any of 
them criticize the Ordinance . . . . Each is no more than a 
proposal of possible employment. The advertisements are thus 
classic examples of commercial speech.38 
Commentators generally agree that the content test is prefer- 
able to the primary purpose test. Various arguments have been 
advanced in support of this preference. First, the content test 
recognizes that  commercial motive does not necessarily make 
speech less deserving of first amendment p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  Second, 
the content test eliminates problems of mixed motives.40 Third, 
the content test has a sounder theroetical base in that it focuses 
not on motive but on speech, which is the preeminent value of the 
first amendment."' The effect of these characteristics of the con- 
35. Id. (citations omitted). 
36. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Pittsburgh Press, a five-to-four decision, is the first Supreme 
Court case since Chrestensen to rely on the commercial speech distinction as the primary 
determinant of the case. Other Supreme Court cases in the interim have involved the 
commercial speech doctrine only incidently. See cases cited note 15 supra. 
37. 413 U.S. at 378-81. 
38. Id. at 385. 
39. Cf.  Redish, supra note 26, at 452. 
40. Cf.  note 33 supra. 
41. See Redish, supra note 26, at 452-57; Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight 
to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAUL . REV. 1258, 1267 (1974); see generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, 
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960). 
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tent test is to provide first amendment protection for a greater 
range of commercial expression. 
B.  The  Commercial Speech Doctrine i n  the Lower Courts 
The lower courts have not been consistent in their applica- 
tion and definition of the commercial speech doctrine.42 State- 
ments of the doctrine range from absolute declarations that "the 
First Amendment deals with the free exchange of ideas and not 
with commercial 'factual' speech,"43 to the opposite extreme that 
"[elven advertisers enjoy first amendment rights, although it is 
said that product advertising is 'less vigorously protected . . . 
than other forms of speech.' "44 A large number of cases adopt an 
approach similar to Chrestensen and deny protection without 
attempting to give a rationale or define the scope of the commer- 
cial speech doctrine." As a result, many of the questions raised 
by Chrestensen remain largely u n a n s ~ e r e d . ~ ~  
C. The  Theoretical Base of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Lower court confusion as to the relationship between com- 
mercial speech and the first amendment can, in large part, be 
traced to the theoretical framework generally attributed to the 
Supreme Court in its interpretation of first amendment cases and 
to the difficult choices that this framework requires in the com- 
mercial context. The Court is generally viewed as accepting Alex- 
ander Meiklejohn's interpretation of the first amendment4' which 
42. DeVore and Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 745,749 (1975); The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 
supra note 29, a t  798. 
43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); accord, Patter- 
son Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821,825 (W.D. Va. 1969) (regulation of commercial 
advertising does not intrude upon first amendment rights of free speech). 
44. Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 
16, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); accord, Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 300 F. Supp. 
1036, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (the commercial element does not 
altogether destroy its quality as protected speech). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205,211 (4th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 
F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969). Contra, Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. 
E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16,22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Rowan v. United States 
Post Office Dep't, 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1039-40 (C.D. Cal. 1969). For a more complete 
summary of these cases, see DeVore and Nelson, supra note 42; Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1124 
(1973). 
46. DeVore and Nelson, supra note 42; The Right to Receive and the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine, supra note 29, a t  798; see Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The 
First Amendment a t  a Discount, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 60, 84-90 (1974). 
47. Dr. Meiklejohn's articulation of the purposes that lie behind the first amendment 
has received considerable attention from commentators. See Brennan, The Supreme 
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draws a sharp distinction between private and public speech.48 
Public speech, that is, speech vital to political decisions or of 
importance to the governing forces of society, receives full first 
amendment p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  Private speech, on the other hand, of 
which commercial speech is a part, receives little or no first 
amendment protection under this in te rp re ta t i~n .~~  The confusion 
sets in early because the distinction between private and public 
speech is difficult to make. This is particularly true in the area 
of commercial speech which Meiklejohn ordinarily classifies as 
private speech. Such a rigid categorization does not appear justi- 
fied since commercial speech often conveys information essential 
to informed personal decisionmaking which may ultimately affect 
the quality of political  decision^.^^ 
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1965); Redish, supra note 26, a t  434-41; Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First 
Amendment: The Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 926,938-42 (1967). 
The Supreme Court appears to have applied Meiklejohn's theory in: Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). 
48. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 41, a t  55-56. This distinction is drawn to prevent 
political speech from losing its uniqueness since i t  is viewed as essential to the mainte- 
nance of a free society. Id. 
49. See id. a t  28. 
50. See Redish, supra note 26, a t  432-36. 
51. For a detailed discussion of these criticisms, see Kalven, The Metaphysics of the 
Law of Obscenity, 1960 S. CT. REV. 1, 15-16; Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and 
the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 761, 769 (1970); Redish, supra note 26, a t  432- 
38; The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, supra note 29, a t  800-01; 
cf. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 895-96 (1949). Individual members of the 
Court have expressed similar criticisms. Justice Douglas, who participated in 
Chrestensen, has long been a critic of the decision, maintaining that though the decision 
was unanimous a t  the time, "it has not survived reflection." Cammarano v. United States, 
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); accord, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts- 
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 398 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Glover, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In 
Dun & Bradstreet u. Glover, Justice Douglas stated his position as follows: 
Nor, in my view, should commercial content be controlling. The language of the 
First Amendment does not except speech directed a t  private economic decision- 
making. Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important thar? 
political expression. 
Id. a t  905. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, expressed 
displeasure with the doctrine in his dissent in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298, 314 (1974) (footnote omitted): 
[Wlhile it is possible that commercial advertising may be accorded less First 
Amendment protection than speech concerning political and social issues of 
public importance . . . it is "speech" nonetheless, often communicating infor- 
mation and ideas found by many persons to be controversial. 
Justice Stewart, in his dissent in Pittsburgh Press, stated: 
Whatever validity the Chrestensen case may still retain when limited to its own 
facts, it certainly does not stand for the proposition that the advertising pages 
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court narrowly defined 
Chrestensen, stating that "[tlhe case obviously does not support 
any sweeping proposition tha t  advertising is unprotected per 
~ e . " ~ '  Relying on past cases to support this position, the Court 
noted that speech is not stripped of first amendment protection 
merely because it appears in commercial form.53 Further, states 
are not free of constitutional restraint merely because the adver- 
tisement "involved sales,"54 or "because the appellant was paid 
for printing it,"55 or "because the appellant's motive or the motive 
of the advertiser may have involved financial gain."" Relying on 
New York Times and Pittsburgh Press, the Court stressed that 
the content, not the commercial setting, determines the degree of 
first amendment protection which an advertisement is to re- 
~e ive .~ '  
Contrasting the content of the abortion advertisement with 
the purely commercial advertisements of Chrestensen and 
Pittsburgh Press, the Court stated that the abortion advertise- 
ment did more than simply propose a commercial t r a n ~ a c t i o n . ~ ~  
The information contained in the abortion advertisement, viewed 
in its entirety, conveyed factual information of clear public inter- 
est and value to a diverse audience including those in need of such 
services, those interested in the subject in general, those inter- 
ested in laws of other states, and those interested in reforming 
Virginia law.59 
The Court then balanced the state interest served by the 
regulation against the first amendment interest of the appellant.60 
of a newspaper are outside the protection given the newspaper by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
413 U.S. a t  401. Joining with Justice Stewart in his dissent was Justice Douglas. Justice 
Blackmun joined with Justice Stewart in all of his dissent except the paragraph where 
Justice Stewart criticized balancing as a judicial technique. Id. at  404. This fact is 
illuminating since Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in the present case and 
used a balancing approach. 
52. 421 U.S. a t  820. 
53. Id. at 818. 
54. Id. (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943), discussed in 
text accompanying notes 17-20 supra). 
55. 421 U.S. a t  818 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), 
discussed in text accompanying notes 30-35 supra). 
56. 421 U.S. a t  418 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)). 
57. See 421 U S .  a t  820-21. 
58. Id. at 822. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 826-27. The Court states: 
[Tlhe task of balancing the interests a t  stake here was one that should have 
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In support of the statute, the state had argued that the regulation 
was necessary to maintain quality medical care within the state." 
Although recognizing this as a legitimate state interest, the Court 
gave it little or no weight since "[nlo claim has been made . . . 
that this particular advertisement in any way affected the quality 
of medical services within Virginia."62 Turning next to the appel- 
lant's alleged free speech interest, the Court noted five considera- 
tions leading to the conclusion that the free speech interest must 
prevail over countervailing interests of the state. First, since 
newspapers have consistently been singled out for special first 
amendment protection, the regulation here, if allowed, might 
impair the proper functioning of a free national press.63 Second, 
the advertisement contained factual information of clear public 
interest to a diverse audience.64 Third, the advertisement con- 
tained no "patently offensive" elements which have traditionally 
been excluded from first amendment pro te~t ion .~~ Fourth, the 
activity advertised was not illegal in either Virginia or New 
been undertaken by the Virginia courts before they reached their decision. We 
need not remand for that purpose, however, because the outcome is readily 
apparent from what has been said above. 
Id. 
For the factors the Court considered, see text accompanying notes 61-67 infra. A 
balancing approach follows naturally from the Court's position that all advertising enjoys 
a degree of first amendment protection, but i t  is unclear whether the Court used ad hoc 
balancing or definitional balancing. Ad hoc balancing weighs the interests of the parties 
in the particular case before it, while definitional balancing takes a particular type of 
speech, e.g., commercial speech, and by balancing larger public policy factors, determines 
the degree of first amendment protection to be afforded a particular category of speech. 
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to 
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 944 (1968). 
61. 421 U.S. at 827. The State of Virginia argued that allowing advertisements by 
commercial abortion referral and placement centers produced fee splitting with and solici- 
tation of patients for doctors by the agencies, practices which professional standards 
condemn as lowering the quality of care ultimately given the patient. See Brief for AppeI- 
lee a t  14, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The state supported this argument by 
noting that New York has, since this case arose, prohibited advertising of the type in issue 
here. Id. a t  13. The New York statute withstood constitutional attack in S. P. S. Consult- 
ants, Inc. u. Lefkowitz, 333 F .  Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For other cases in which the 
statute was enforced, see New York v. Abortion Information Agency, Inc., 323 N.Y.S.2d 
597 (Sup. Ct. 1971); New York v. Mitchell, 321 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1971). 
62. 421 U.S. at 827. The Court felt there was little justification for a Virginia statute 
which attempts to prevent Virginians from using services in New York, which are legal in 
New York, by erecting an information shield. The Virginia statute was viewed by the 
Court as an improper use of Virginia's police power. Id. a t  824-25. 
63. Id. a t  828-29. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58 
(1974). Part of the evidence in the Bigelow case was a similar advertisement published in 
Redbook. See note 3 supra. 
64. 421 US.  a t  822. 
65. Id. a t  828. 
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York? Fifth, the advertisement did not impinge upon other im- 
portant individual rights such as the right to privacy.67 The Court 
concluded that the statute as applied impermissibly violated the 
appellant's first amendment rights of freedom of speech and 
The dissenting Justices argued that the advertisement in the 
present case was entitled to little or no first amendment protec- 
tion since it, like the ads in Chrestensen and Pittsburgh Press, 
was merely an offer of services,69 and was therefore outweighed by 
the state's interest in preventing medical practices "inimical" to 
the health of its citizens.'O 
A. Commercial Advertising and the First Amendment 
The present case represents a significant attempt by the 
Supreme Court to reconcile the commercial speech doctrine with 
the guarantees of the first amendment. The Court, using Meikle- 
john's private-public speech dichotomy, could have decided the 
present case in one of two ways. By stressing the controversial 
nature of the subject of the advertisement and the intense public 
debate surrounding that subject as it related to political reform," 
the Court could have found the ad to be political and therefore 
entitled to full first amendment protection. On the other hand, 
the Court could have found that the ad was merely an offer of 
services-clearly private speech-and without first amendment 
protection. Instead, the Court recognized that the advertisement 
published by the appellant contained both private and public 
speech which when viewed in its entirety conveyed factual infor- 
mation of "public interest"72 and therefore deserved some, though 
66. Id. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 389 (1973). 
67. 421 U.S. a t  829. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. at 830-31. For a recital of the practices "inimical to the public interest," see 
note 61 supra. 
71. Brief for Appellant a t  9, Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973). The Court in 
its preface to Roe u. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973), acknowledged its 
awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of 
the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seem- 
ingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's 
experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious 
training, one's attitude toward life and family and their values, and the moral 
standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and 
to color one's thinking and conclusion about abortion. 
72. See text accompanying note 59 supra. 
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perhaps not a full degree of, first amendment protection. Indeed, 
the Court stated in dictum that even purely commercial advertis- 
ing is entitled to a degree of constitutional pr~tection. '~ The Court 
therefore, by affording at  least some first amendment protection 
to commercial speech, took a significant step away from Meikle- 
john's generalization that commercial speech is included in the 
private speech category and merits no such protection. A question 
remains, however, concerning the degree or scope of protection 
the Court will afford commercial speech under the new approach 
of the present case. 
B. The Scope of Protection 
The present case does not stand for the proposition that all 
commercial advertising is to receive full first amendment protec- 
tion; the language of the Court is explicit in stating that purely 
commercial speech enjoys only a degree of such protection.'' It 
appears, however, that each particular advertisement will receive 
a varying degree of protection depending on the value or import- 
ance the Court ascribes to the message or informational content 
of the ad. This thesis is supported by a comparison of the present 
case with New York Times and Pittsburgh Press, two cases repre- 
senting the extremes of a continuum of protection. The ad in New 
York Times, representing a solely political advertisement, falls a t  
one extreme and receives full first amendment pr~tection. '~ The 
Pittsburgh Press ads, representing purely commercial advertise- 
ments, fall a t  the other extreme and receive a minimal degree of 
prote~tion. '~ The ad in the present case was like the advertise- 
ment in New York Times in that i t  conveyed to a diverse audience 
information which was vital to important personal decisionmak- 
ing a t  both the private and public levels. But it was also similar 
to the Pittsburgh Press ads in that it was intended as an offer of 
services and did not explicitly advocate or express a position on 
matters of public policy. Since the abortion ad contains elements 
found in both the New York Times and the Pittsburgh Press 
advertisements, it falls somewhere between these two extremes 
73. 421 U.S. a t  821. The proposition that all advertising, including "purely commer- 
cial" advertising, receives a degree of first amendment protection is strongly supported 
by dicta in the opinion. Id. Since the Court held that the abortion advertisement was not 
purely commercial, however, it is not possible to state the exact position the Court would 
take when faced with a purely commercial advertisment, if such a category of advertise- 
ments continues to exist. See text immediately following note 80 infra. 
74. 421 U.S. a t  821. 
75. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra. 
76. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra. 
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and was so treated by the Court." Indeed, it can be argued that 
the Court in the present case created and applied an approach 
that permits a limitless number of intermediate treatments: the 
Court evaluates each advertisement on an ad hoc basis and af- 
fords each ad a varying degree of protection depending on the 
relative importance of its message or informational content. 
The present case, like New York Times and other prior cases, 
ascribes importance to commercial messages of "public inter- 
e~ t . " '~  The Court, however, appears to have expanded the scope 
of the term "public interest." The term was used in New York 
Times to refer to information vital to political decisi~nmaking.~~ 
As used in the present case, however, the term includes not only 
information vital to the political processes but information of 
interest to a diverse audience for other than political reasons.*O 
Significant consequences flow from this expanded definition of 
"public interest." Since nearly all advertising is of some "public 
interest," as the term is used in the present case, the category of 
purely commercial speech becomes relatively insignificant or 
even nonexistent. The end result is that a greater number and 
variety of advertisements qualify for a greater measure of first 
amendment protection. Indeed, it can be argued that with its 
expanded definition of "public interest," the Court is moving 
toward greater first amendment protection for all commercial 
speechY 
77. See 421 US.  at 818-22, 826. 
78. 421 U S .  a t  822. 
79. See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
80. See 421 U S .  at  822. 
81. The instant case is already having an impact on lower court treatment of the 
commercial speech doctrine with a resultant increase in protection afforded advertising. 
In Terminal-Hudson Electronics, Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 44 L.W. 2337 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 6, 1976), a three judge federal district court struck down as violative of the first 
amendment California statutes prohibiting advertisements of the cost of commodities 
furnished or services performed, by optometrists. In reaching its decision, the court stated: 
The state, however, contends that news media paid informational advertise- 
ments of price structures for commodities and services are "commercial" speech 
and enjoy no First Amendment protection under the rationale and rule of Valen- 
tine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Chrestensen rational has been 
criticized for nearly 20 years and was lately sent into oblivion by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U S .  809,43 LW 4734 (1975). Bigelow 
involved commercial advertising of an abortion referral service, while the issue 
before this court is commercial advertising of eyeglasses. But both involve com- 





The present case, while not defining the boundaries of the 
commercial speech doctrine in all circumstances, substantially 
clarifies the Court's position on commercial speech and the first 
amendment and gives viable guidelines to those lower courts 
which have been divided on the issue. It should now be clear that 
a per se exclusion of commercial speech from first amendment 
protection is unacceptable. A free speech interest, though per- 
haps limited, inheres in all commercial messages. That interest 
must be evaluated and balanced against any competing state 
interest and afforded an appropriate degree of protection from 
restrictive measures. 
